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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
CARL H. FULDA* AND HOWARD C. KLEMME**
Enforcement of the federal antitrust laws' is, of course, primarily
the business of the U. S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission. However, any person injured in his business or property by
reason of conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue in any U. S.
district court and "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."' Similarly,
"any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States. . . , against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ....
Thus, private litigation may be resorted to as a supplement to, or, if
plaintiff can afford it, as a substitute for governmental action; by all
reports, such private litigation has enormously increased since the end of
World War II.
Our inquiry into the problem of statutory limitations must, neces-
sarily, take into account this dual system of antitrust enforcement. Indeed,
in so far as litigation initiated by the Government is concerned, we must
further subdivide the field into criminal and civil proceedings. The
former are governed by the general statute of limitations applicable to all
federal offenses which bars prosecutions "unless the indictment is found
or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense
shall have been committed." 5 The application of this statute to Sherman
Act prosecutions thus represents only one aspect of the general problem of
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IFor a definition of the term see Clayton Act §1, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C.A. §§12-27 (1951), and Federal Trade Commission Act §4, 38 STAT. 719
(1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §44 (1951).
2 Clayton Act §4, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §15 (1951) ; Sherman Act,
§7, 26 STAT. 210 (1890); Wilson Tariff Act, §77, 28 STAT. 570 (1894).
3 Clayton Act §16, 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §26 (1951).
4 See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of
Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1063-65 (1952);
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Po'wer of the House
Committee on the Judiciary [on H.R. 3408 to amend the Clayton Act by Granting
a Right of Action to the United States to Recover Damages under the Antitrust
Laws, Establishing a Uniform Statute of Limitations, and for other purposes,]
82d Cong., 1 Sess., Ser. 1, pt. 3, at 109-111 (1951).
5 68 STAT. 1145 (1954), 18 U.S.C.A. §3282 (Cum. Supp. 1954). As originally
enacted, the statute provided for a three year period. 62 STAT. 828 (1948). The
Amendment lengthening that period to five years became effective on September 1,
1954, with respect to offenses (1) committed on or after that date or (2) committed
prior thereto if on Sept. 1, 1954 prosecution therefor was not barred by the three-
year period of limitation. Public L. No. 769, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §10 (1954).
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limitations relating to crimes (including criminal conspiracies), to which
we shall refer in Section II of this article.
There is no federal limitation of civil antitrust actions instituted by
the Government, and state statutes are not applicable against the United
States.6 By the same token, it has been generally held that the defenses
of laches and estoppel are not available against the Government.7
Consequently, the difficulties with respect to time limitation of
antitrust enforcement arise primarily with respect to the area of private
litigation. As noted above, such private litigation can be brought only
in a federal court. Yet, Congress failed to provide a period of limita-
tion.' However, it would have been absurd to imagine that private anti-
trust claimants were to be permitted to delay indefinitely the bringing of
such suits. Indeed, Congress clearly indicated that some period of limita-
tion should govern such claims: It provided in Section 5 of the Clayton
Act' that whenever the United States commences a civil or criminal anti-
6 U.S. v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125
(1886) ; "It is settled beyond doubt or controversy-upon the foundation of the
great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids
that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or
agents to whose care they are confided-that the United States, asserting rights
vested in them as a sovereign government, are not bound by any statute of limita-
tions, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that they should be so
bound." Accord, U.S. v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414- (1940). See 6 ToULMIN, ANn-
TRusT LAWs §5.6 and cases cited.
7 Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S., 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917): "... [Liaches or
neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit
by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest." U.S. v. Southern
Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214, 240, (1922): No estoppel against Government in Sherman
Act suit brought to compel defendant Co. to dispose of its controlling interest in
Central Pacific Ry. Co.; defense of laches not recognized; Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 623-624 (1953): "Doubtless, long-tolerated trade
arrangements acquire no vested immunity under the Sherman Act; no prescriptive
rights accrue by the prosecutor's delay." U.S. v. Eastman Kodak Co. of New York,
230 Fed. 522 (W.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 575 (1921): Laches not
applicable since defendants knew of Government's objections to their methods of
doing business. U.S. v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157, 164 (D.C.NJ.
1949): Laches rejected as a matter of fact and law; preparation of civil antitrust
suit necessitates "minute and detailed study to develop the facts," and United
States asserted "rights as a sovereign to enforce a public policy" (citing U.S. v.
Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1888) and U.S. v. Insley, 130 U.S. 263, 266 (1889)).
Accord, U.S. v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471, 474- (S.D.N.Y. 1953), citing American
Surety Co. of New York v. U.S., 112 Fed. 2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1940). See, also,
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-2.27 (1940).
8 As originally reported to the Senate by its Judiciary Committee, the Clayton
Act of 1914 included a six-year statute of limitations. This provision was omitted
from the final draft. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., [on H.R.
7905: A Bill to Amend the Clayton Act with Respect to the Recovery of Triple
Damages under the Antitrust Laws, and for other purposes,) ser. 14, pt. 5, at 24
and 99 (1950).
938 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §16 (1951).
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trust suit, "the running of the statute of limitations in respect of each and
every private right of action... based in whole or in part on any matter
complained of in said suit . . .shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof." The question, then, is: 'Where do we find the statute of limita-
tions for these private rights of action?
An early attempt at discovering an applicable federal statute remained
unsuccessful. In Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta ° the city brought an action for recovery of treble damages against
two Tennessee corporations in the United States Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that it had been forced to pay an
unreasonable price for iron water pipes as a result of an unlawful combi-
nation and price-fixing conspiracy of which defendants were members.
The event complained of occurred more than three but less than five
years before commencement of this action. The city invoked a provision
in the Revised Statutes of the United Stites, now to be found in the Fed-
eral Judicial Code, that proceedings "for the enforcement of any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be enter-
tained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued.. .,"" but the court held that a treble damage action under
the Sherman Act was not a suit for a penalty because "the test whether a
law is penal .. .is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong
to the public, or a wrong to the individual ... ."" The court thus implied
that the treble damage action was solely designed as a private remedy,
and the facts of the Chattanooga Foundry case certainly justified this con-
clusion. The defendants in that case had already been found to be parties
to a monopolistic combination in a prior suit brought against them by the
Government. 3 Significantly, the most attractive feature of treble damage
actions seems to be the provision of the Clayton Act that a judgment or
decree obtained by the Government against a defendant in an antitrust
case "shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant" in a private
action brought against him.14 This allows the private plaintiff "the ad-
vantage of government findings and government discoveries," and this
arrangement is surely a wise and necessary one, since, as Thurman
Arnold recently observed, "the ordinary small-business man just cannot
bring a suit for treble damages unless he has a very large sum of money
or unless the government does it for him."' 5 The tolling of the statute
10 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
1162 STAT. 974 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §2462 (1950), Rsv. STAT. §1047 (2d ed.
1878).
12 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892). To same effect see Brady
v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 155, 156 (1899).
13 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
14 See note 9 supra.
IS Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate,
81st Cong. 1st Sess., at 3-4 (1949), [on S. 1910 to amend the Sherman and Clayton
Acts to provide a uniform period of limitations within which treble damage suits
may be instituted under the antitrust laws].
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of limitations during the pendency of a government suit reflects, of course,
the same considerations.
While the Chattanooga case thus pointed to the absence of any fed-
eral statute, it also held that, because of such absence, the statute of
limitations of the state in which the suit was brought determined the
matter pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act which ordains that "the
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply."' 6
Evidently, this opened a pandora's box of difficulties. Since causes
of action under the antitrust laws are created by federal law and are
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, 17 state statutes of limitations
explicitly applicable to such actions do not exist. Indeed, state statutes of
limitations directed expressly and exclusively at federal claims and pre-
scribing shorter periods of limitations than those prescribed for comparable
actions under state law have been held unconstitutional as discriminating
against rights arising under federal law in violation of the supremacy
clause of Article VI of the Constitution and the equal protection clause
of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment.' Consequently, we must deal
16 This provision was first enacted on Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, sec. 34, vol. 1, p. 92.
It was reenacted as REv. STAT. §721 (2d ed. 1878) and is now to be found in the
Judicial Code of 1948, 62 STAT. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1652 (1950). In Campbell
v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) the Court held that the six-year Massachusetts
statute of limitations relating to torts barred a claim for patent infringement, a
federal cause of action subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, thus rejecting plain-
tiff's contention that in such a case the Rules of Decision Act should not govern
because of the phrase "in cases where they apply." The Court observed (p. 614)
that "to no class of state legislation has the above provision [Rules of Decision
Act] been more steadfastly and consistently applied than to statutes prescribing the
time within which actions shall be brought within its jurisdiction." The argument
that states without power to create patent rights may not limit such rights could be
recognized only if a state statute discriminated against causes of action enforceable
only in the federal courts. (p. 615). In the absence of unreasonable discrimination
it was "reasonable to presume that Congress, in authorizing an action for infringe-
ment, intended to subject such action to the general laws of the state applicable to
actions of similar nature." Otherwise, we would "have the anomaly of a distinct
class of action subject to no limitation whatever; a class of privileged plaintiffs
." (p. 616).
17 For examples of federal rights enforceable in federal or state courts see
Fair Labor Standards Act §16(b), 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 61 STAT. 87 (1947), 63
STAT. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C.A. §216(b) (Cum. Supp. 1954-); Federal Employers
Liability Act §6, 35 STAT. 66, as last amended 62 STAT. 989 (1948), 45 U.S.C.A. §56
(1954).
18 Republi Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 Fed. 2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1945),
aff'd, 327 U.S. 757 (1946). Accord, Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co.,
.105 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Colo. 1952), Defendant in treble damage action invoked
Colorado statute: "All actions upon a liability created by a federal statute other
than for a forfeiture or penalty for which actions no period of limitation is
provided in such statute shall be commenced within two years after the cause of
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with state statutes which were framed without any reference to, or
consideration of, federal antitrust claims; and since all states do not have
one statute of limitations, but a great many,"9 the crucial problem would
seem to be the selection of the appropriate limitation. We must, then,
demonstrate how the courts try to find the proper statute of limitations
for an antitrust case, a process somehow comparable to the job of a tailor
attempting to select the best fitting garment for a choosy customer.
Defendants in the Chattanooga case urged that the cause of action
was barred either by the one-year Tennessee statute "for statute penalties"
or by the three-year statute relating to actions for "injuries to personal
or real property; actions for detention or conversion of personal prop-
erty.")20 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, rejected the first
of these statutes because of the construction already adopted with respect
to the similarly worded federal statute. The second was held not applica-
ble for the following reasons:
It was pressed upon us that formerly the limitations ad-
dressed themselves to forms of action, that actions upon the case,
such as this would have been, were barred in three years, ...
and that when a change was necessary by the doing away with
the old forms of action, it is not to be supposed that the change
was intended to affect the substance, or more than the mode of
stating the time allowed. Of course, it was argued also that
this was an injury to property, within the plain meaning of the
words. But we are satisfied, on the whole, and in view of its
juxtaposition with detention and conversion, that the phrase has
a narrower intent . .. there is a sufficiently clear distinction
between injuries to property and "injured in his business or
property," the latter being the language of the Act of Congress.
A man is injured in his property when his property is diminished.
He would not be said to have suffered an injury to his property
unless the harm fell upon some object more definite and less
ideal than his total wealth. A trade-mark, or a trade name,
or a title, is property, and is regarded as an object capable of
injury in various ways. But when a man is made poorer by an
extravagant bill we do not regard his wealth as a unity, or the
tort, if there is one, as directed against that unity as an object.
We do not go behind the person of the sufferer. We say that he
has been defrauded or subjected to duress, or whatever it may,
and stop there.2 '
Consequently, the Court held that the action was timely since it was
action shall have accrued." Motion to strike out defense granted. Held: Treble
damage action is comparable to trespass on the case which in Colorado is subject
to six-year statute, hence statute relied on by defendant is discriminatory and
unconstitutional. See also Campbell v. Haverhill, supra note 16.
19 See OHIO REV. CoDE c. 2305 (1953).
20These statutes are still in effect: TENN. CODE ANN. §§8595 and 8598
(Williams 1934).
21203 U.S. 390, 398, 399 (1906).
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governed by the ten-year Tennessee statute which barred "all other cases
not expressly provided for.""2
The quotation set forth above illustrates how the Court picked from
three possible choices provided by the state code on limitation of civil
actions. The Court, to borrow Professor Hart's telling phrase, thus
tried to adopt or absorb2" state law; yet it did not cite a single Tennessee
decision. The question, then, arises as to the standards which should guide
the process of adoption or absorption. Should the federal court scrutinize
not only the state statutes, but also the state court decisions applying those
statutes to comparable state causes of action, in order to determine eligi-
bility for federal adoption? Or should the nature of the action and the
state statute with the most appropriate language be determined solely by
federal antitrust jurisprudence? In short, we are now faced with the
question of characterization.
Although Mr. Justice Holmes in the Chattanooga case did not analyze
the problem in those terms, his opinion seems to reflect the federal
characterization approach at least in so far as the state statute of limita-
tions for statutory penalties was concerned. Since a treble damage action
was held not to be an action for a penalty within the federal meaning
of that term, it could not be such an action within the state's connotation
of the same term, or, at least, the state's connotation would be irrelevant.
This may have justified the expectation that the Chattanooga case, to this
day the-only Supreme Court decision dealing with the problem which is
the subject of this article, settled at least one point: State statutes of
limitations governing actions for statutory penalties would never be
applicable to private antitrust litigation.
If this expectation was ever seriously entertained, it proved to be
unduly optimistic. Indeed, when we come to the three-year period for
property damage, the Chattanooga decision switches from federal to state
characterization, since the Court seemingly attempted to guess whether the
Tennessee courts would have applied their own statute if an action of this
kind could be brought before them.2 4 In essence, the question is whether
the federal courts should or should not be required to make and document
that kind of hypothetical estimate; it can never be more than that for the
22 TENN. CODE ANN. §8601 (Williams 1934).
23 Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Laws, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
489, 529 (1954).
24 The lower courts cited some Tennessee cases construing the Tennessee
three-year statute: City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co., 101 Fed.
900, 909 (D.C.E.D. Tenn. 1900) ; 127 Fed. 23, 29, 31, 32 (6th Cir. 1903), aff'd, 203
U.S. 390 (1906). Cf. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947): Suit by receiver of
insolvent national bank against shareholders residing in Ohio and Pennsylvania
to enforce their statutory double liability under the National Banking Act. Held,
that in absence of federal statute of limitations the statutes of Ohio and Penn-
sylvania limiting the time for bringing actions based on statutory liability and the




obvious reason that state courts do not have jurisdiction to hear antitrust
complaints. If the estimate must be made, we may even find that in some
states the period of limitation for statutory penalties does apply to antitrust
treble damage actions, the Chattanooga case to the contrary notwith-
standing.
This conflict between federal and state characterization runs through
all the reported cases with the result that the obvious lack of uniformity
inherent in adoption of varying state laws is increased by confusion with
respect to the methods of adoption. The matter is further complicated
by the question as to whether the Rules of Decision Act requires either
state or federal characterization. That act, after all, merely provides
that the laws of the state shall govern, but, on its face, it does not reveal
the process by which the applicable state law must be selected for the
purpose of absorption into an otherwise exclusively federal situation.
I. CHARACTERIZATION AND THE CHOICE OF THE APPLICABLE
PERIOD OF LIMrrATION.
In some circuits, state characterization reigns supreme. Thus, in
Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp. v. Truax Traer Coal Co.25 the cause of
action for treble damages arose in Illinois more than two years prior to
the commencement of the action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the
Illinois statute which prescribed a two-year period for actions "for a
statutory penalty."2 The court observed that "the intent of the phrase,
statutory penalty, as used in the statute, has been determined -by the Su-
preme Court of Illinois" in a decision involving a state statute permitting
recovery of triple damages by a shipper against a railroad which had
charged freight rates in excess of those fixed by state authorities." "In
view of the close analogy between the cause of action there involved and
one arising under Section 4 of the Clayton Act the decision would seem
to be controlling.... In each, threefold damages and attorneys fees are
in the nature of a penalty not recoverable except by virtue of the statute."
But what about the Chattanooga case? Plaintiff was told that its reliance
on that case was "misplaced" since "there the state determination was
that the ten-year statute applied; here the state determination is that the
two-year statute controls. In other words, in Illinois, actions such as this
are, as decided by the highest court of the state, barred within two
years.")28 As noted above, this may not be the correct reading of the
25 191 F. 2d 912 (7th Cir. 1951), noted in 65 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (1952).
26 ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 83, §15 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
27 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N.E. 247, 258
(1894).
28 191 F. 2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1951). The court added that this conclusion was
binding under Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893). That case involved an
action on a promissory note brought by a citizen of Illinois against a citizen of
Kansas in a state court of Kansas and subsequently removed to a federal court:
the Kansas statute of limitations as construed by the Supreme Court of Kansas was
1955]
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Chattanooga case. However, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed this position
in two later cases, 29 one of which cited the Rules of Decisions Act in
support of the proposition "that the applicable limitation must be deter-
mined by the state statute as interpreted by the courts of the state." ' 9
Significantly, these cases adopting the Illinois limitation of actions
for statutory penalties stand alone. Everywhere else state statutes of
limitations covering penal actions have been held inapplicable."1 Yet, this
is not inconsistent with state characterization. Indeed, a plausible re-
concilation between Chattanooga and state characterization may be found
in Florida Wholesale Drug, Inc. v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. 2
That was a treble damage action brought in the district court in New
Jersey by a Florida corporation against a New Jersey corporation for price
discrimination in violation of the Clayton Act; The cause of action arose
in Florida, but the Florida statute of limitations was not considered since
the statute of the forum controls.3 " The New Jersey statute limiting to
two years the time for any action "brought for any forfeiture upon any
penal statute . . . when the benefit of the forfeiture and the action
therefore is or shall be limited or given to theparty aggrieved" 4 was also
held inapplicable. The court explained that, because of Chattanooga, "it
must be shown that the View of the state courts as to a penalty, differs
radically from the view of the federal courts in that regard, before a
state penalty limitation can be found applicable to this federal nonpenal
proceeding"," the court's, examination of the New .Jersey cases resulted
in the conclusion that no such difference could be found." The apparent
conflict with the Seventh Circuit could, thus, be resolved by the ob-
heid appucaoie. Ooviously, this was a very different situation than the one we are
discussing in this article.
29 Schiffman Bros., Inc. v. Texas Co., 196 F. 2d 695 (7th Cir. 1952); Sun
Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F. 2d 284, 288 (7th Cir. 1954).
In the' latter case plaintiff contended that he was entitled to single damages. The
court held that under the Clayton Act he was entitled to treble damages and none
other, and that he could not avoid the two-year statute by claiming only single
damages.
30 Schiffman Bros., Inc. v. Texas Co., 196 F. 2d 695, 696 (7th Cir. 1952). To
the same effect see DeLuca v. Loew's, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. IIl. 1953) and
Barnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 112 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill.
1953).
31 Florida Wholesale Drug, Inc. v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 110 F.
Supp. 573, 577 (D.C.N.J. 1953) and cases cited. Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 752, 753 (S.D. N.Y. 1953): see cases cited in note 23 sujra.
32 See note 31 supra.
33 RESTATEMENT CONFLICT OF LAWS §§603-604 (1934).
34 N.J. STA:T. ANN. 2A: 14-10(b) (1952).
35 110 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D.C. N.J. 1953). Accord, Christensen v. Paramount
Pictures, 95 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D.C. Utah 1950).
36 In 1922 a New Jersey federal court had come to the same conclusion in
Shelton Electric Co. v..Vtor Talking Machine Co., 277 Fed. 433 (D.C. N.J. 1922).
Bat 4. Haskell v. 'Perkins, 28 F. 2d 222 (D.C. N.J. 1928): Treble damage action
held pbrnitive and, therefore, does not survive claimant's death.
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servation that the Illinois concept of statutory penalties is radically differ-
ent and, therefore, compelled the Seventh Circuit to label an action as
penal which would not be so labeled in many other jurisdictions.3 7 In fact,
it was emphasized that in selecting the proper statute, the court "must...
determine not its own viewpoint as to what New Jersey limitation statute
is applicable, but what the New Jersey state courts would decide was the
New Jersey limitation statute applicable . . ."; it held that this was the
six-year statute pertaining to "every action at law for.., any tortious in-
jury to the rights of another . . ." [other than personal injury, libel or
slander]," which was designed for actions "on the case." 40
A similar characterization was applied in Delaware, where it was
held that a treble damage action alleging violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act 1 "discloses a cause of action which, under the common law
of Delaware, would be enforceable in an action on the case and not in an
action of debt on a specialty."42 Therefore, the Delaware three-year
limitation of actions "to recover damages caused by an injury un-
accompanied with force or resulting indirectly from the act of the de-
fendant"43 was applied.
The method of state characterization described above thus resulted
in the adoption of a two-year period in Illinois, a six-year period in New
Jersey and a three-year period in Delaware. We now turn to inquire into
the decisions in those circuits which talk in terms of federal character-
ization. In Fulton v. Loew's Inc.44 plaintiff filed suit for treble damages
in the district court in Kansas against an unlicensed foreign corporation
engaged in interstate business in Kansas. The court held that under
Kansas law such a corporation may avail itself of the Kansas statutes of
37 In Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 756 (S.D. N.Y.
1953), Judge Ryan said that the Illinois cases are "entirely in accord with
Chattanooga."
38 See note 35 supra.
a9 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 14-1 (1952).
40 H. J. Jaeger Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Radio Corporation of America,
90 F. 2d 826, 828 (3rd Cir. 1937) : Held, that treble damage action would at common
law be an action on the case, therefore six-year statute applies. "We have not
overlooked the decisions of the courts of New Jersey."
41 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. §18 (1951): Acquisition by one corpo-
ration of stock of another.
4 2 Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation, 110 F. 2d 15, 20
(3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940). Obviously, the abolition of the
common law forms of action by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was clearly
irrelevant since this was a matter of state law pursuant to the Rules of Decision
Act. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation, supra at 19. 4ccord,
Park-In Theatres v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 90 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Del.
1950), af'd, 185 F. 2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 950 (1951) ; that
case involved an action for conspiracy under Sherman Act. Note, Disparities in
Time Limitations on Federal Causes of iction, 49 YALE L.J. 738 (1940).
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §8106 (1953).
44 114 F. Supp. 676 (D.C. Kan. 1953).
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limitations. Defendant invoked the one-year period for actions "upon a
statute for penalty or forfeiture," urging that under Kansas court inter-
pfetations the action was penal. The court, however, held the three-year
period applicable which governed actions "upon a liability created by
statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty."4 5 Significantly, the court
concecfed, on the basis of its examination of Kansas decisions, that Kansas
courts, like Illinois courts, applied their one-year statute to actions in-
stituted in Kansas to recover more than actual damages. Consequently,
the rationale of state characterization would have required application of
the one-year period in accordance with the Hoskins case46 in the Seventh
Circuit. However, the court adopted, instead, the "federal approach"
which "starts with the initial premise that the nature of the action, as
construed by the United States Supreme Court in the Chattanooga case,
is remedial and compensatory and not penal. Clearly that was the holding,
. . . else there would have been no reason ever to have had any concern
with the state statute of limitations. . . . The cases taking the 'federal'
approach seem to apply the state statute of limitations to the cause of
action given under the Sherman Act as if the construction of that act by
the Supreme Court were a part of it." 4 Indeed, the court felt "con-
strained" to take the federal approach because:
Federal law is dispositive of the time of accrual of a federal
cause of action for the purpose of applying a state statute of
limitations. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96. It governs the
question who is the real party in interest, U.S. v. Aetna Cas.
& Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366; Gas Service Co. v. Hunt, 183
Fed. 2d 417; whether an amendment to a complaint relates
back to the filing of the complaint so as to come within the
limitations period, Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 46 Fed. 2d 29,
Am. Fidel. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 179 Fed.
2d 7; and the time of commencement of an exclusively federal
action, Bonar v. Keyes, 162 Fed. 2d 136, .... The doctrine
of Erie R.R. Co. is inapplicable to the "areas of Judicial decision
within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep
of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be
deemed governed by federal law having its source in those
statutes, rather than by local law." Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electr. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176.48
Similarly, in Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.4 9 the same result-rejection of the Seventh Circuit state character-
ization approach and of the allegation that the cause of action was one for
a statutory penalty-was reached on the basis of the following observations:
Whatever may be the judicial prerogative of state courts to
4 5 KAN. GEN. STAT. §60-306 (1949).
46 See note 25 supra.
47 114 F. Supp. 676, 682 (D.C. Kan. 1953).
48 Id. at 683.
49 113 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
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construe their own statutes, we do not believe that they can
ever assume the awesome role of Delphic Oracle on such a
fundamental matter as to with finality characterize or classify a
purely federal cause of action. It is true that a federal court
will, particularly in diversity cases, apply state court construction
to a state-derived cause of action. But when state court con-
struction, even of its own statutes, invades the province of
characterization in a field divorced from state regulation, then
clearly such an invasion of the federal judicial province is en-
titled to no consideration. The line of demarcation between
statutory construction and characterization is often elusive and
distressingly vague. Yet, we cannot ignore the distinction.
Although by federal law we are directed to the state statutes of
limitations in cases of this kind, we do not think that such
procedural directive transforms state adjective law into a spring-
board from which state courts can assert a formative influence
on federal substantive law. Regardless of defendant's protesta-
tions to the contrary, to allow an antitrust action to be character-
ized as one for a penalty or forfeiture, depending on state
court stare decisis, would involve considerably more than "statu-
tory construction" for a limited procedural purpose.
50
These quotations epitomize the reasons for the federal approach.
Indeed, the majority of courts, as noted above, rejected the "penal"
characterization of antitrust actions for the same reasons. 5 In Ohio,
a federal district court adopted what might be called a mixed or composite
approach: The one-year period for actions "upon a statute for a penalty
or forfeiture" 52 was held not applicable because the court found one Ohio
case, in addition to dozens seemingly to the contrary cited by the defendant,
which stated that a statutory police regulation enforceable by public au-
thority and private complainants would not be regarded as penal.53 Since
this same Ohio case had been cited by the lower courts in Chattanooga,
the court added that the result was in line with Chattanooga, and that in
case of doubt as to the meaning given to state statutes of limitations by state
court decisions, the federal court must determine the matter independ-
5O Id. at 94-1.
.1 See note 31 supra. See, particularly, Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 751, 756, 757 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); Winkler-Koch Engineering
Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Wolf Sales
Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., note 18 supra; New York Credit Men's Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. N.Y. 1954). Federal
characterization has also been used to support a holding that the survival of a
treble damage action should be determined by federal law andd state limitation
applicable to non-surviving actions therefore is irrelevant. Barnes Coal Corp. v.
Retail Coal Merchants' Ass'n, 128 F. 2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942), noted in 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 1346 (1942).
52 OHio REV. CoDE §2305.11 (1953).
53 Reid v. Doubleday & Co., 109 F. Supp. 354, 361, 362 (N.D. Ohio 1952),
citing Pittsburgh, Ft. Worth & C. Ry. Co. v. Methven, 21 Ohio St. 586 (1871).
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ently.54 It was, finally, held that the six-year statute for actions "upon a
liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty"85 was
controlling."8
It thus appears that courts using federal characterization look to
Chattanooga like the astronomer looks to the North Star: A fixed and
invariable point which settles once and for all that state statutes applicable
to penalties shall never be adopted. Hence, this approach is certainly simpler
than the state approach,"' although it settles only a negative point, since
it excludes only one type of statute from consideration; if several others
are left to pick from, the search would have to start all over again.
However, in the majority of jurisdictions the limitation for actions
creating statutory liabilities other than penalties has been held to apply.5 8
But in some states, other types of limitations were adopted."9 In Kentucky
the courts have applied- different statutes to different types of antitrust
claims: A treble damage action for conspiracy under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act was held barred by the one-year statute limiting "an action
for conspiracy," 60 while a treble damage action for violation of the
54 Reid v. Doubleday & Co., supra note 53 at 363.
55 OHIO REV. CODE §2305.07 (1953).
56 Reid v. Doubleday & Co., supra note 53; Reid v. Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
57 However, Cope v. Anderson, supra note 24, followed the state approach,
indicating that the present attitude of the Supreme Court as to state statutes of
limitation in federal areas outside the antitrust field is inconsistent with the
Chattanooga case. See, generally, Blume and George, Limitations and the Federal
Courts, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 937 (1951).
58 See notes 56, 51, 49, 44 supra; Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, 172
F. 2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Levy v. Paramount
Pictures, 104 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax
Consolidated, Ltd., 170 F. 2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949) ;
Suckow-Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 185 F. 2d 196
(9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951) ; Crummer Co. v. DuPont, 117 F.
Supp. 8 0 (N.D. Fla. 1954). It is hardly necessary to add that there are variations
in the length of the statutory periods.
59 As explained above, the Chattanooga case itself adopted the "omnibus"
statute. To the same effect see Ben C. Jones & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 270
Fed. 563 (5th Cir. 1921), 'writ of error dismissed, 270 U.S. 665 (1926), Texas four-
year statute for "every action . . . for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed."
TEXAS Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 5529 (Vernon 1941) ; Harvey v. Booth Fisheries, 228
Fed. 782 (W.D. Wash. 1915), Washington three-year statute, now to be found in
WASH. REv. CODE §4.16.080(2) (1951), "for any other injury to . . . rights of an-
other not hereinafter enumerated." Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, 95 F. Supp.
446, 450 (D.C. 'Utah 1951), Utah four-year "omnibus" statute limiting "an action
for relief not otherwise provided for by law." UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25(2)
(1953). Don George, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 111 F. Supp. 458, 465, 471 (W.D.
La. 1951), plea of prescription overruled and determination of applicable statute
deferred until trial; court states that either one-year statute for torts or ten-year
omnibus statute would apply. LA CIV. CODE, art. 3536, 3544 (West 1953).
60 Northern Ky. Telephone Co. -. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
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brokerage provision of the Robinson-Patman Act6 ' was held subject to
the five-year statute.62
All of this presents a bewildering variety of different limitation
periods in the various states.'s However, the picture would be incomplete
without consideration of the so-called "borrowing statutes" which create
additional diversity. An example of such a statute is Section 2305.20 of
the Ohio Revised Code which provides:
If the laws of any state or country where a cause of action
arose limit the time for the commencement of the action to a
lesser number of years than do the statutes of this state in like
causes of action then said cause of action shall be barred in this
state at the expiration of said lesser number of years.
In other words, the principle that the statute of limitations of the forum
applies has been modified by these statutes which, under certain prescribed
circumstances, "borrow" the statute of limitations of the jurisdiction where
the cause of action arose. Since a federal court in private antitrust litiga-
tion must adopt the applicable state statute of the state in which the court
is sitting, it is obvious that the adoption must include the "borrowing"
statute of that state, if one has been enacted. Thus, a federal court in
California applied the Texas statute of limitations pursuant to the Cali-
fornia borrowing statute in a treble damage action where the cause of
action arose in Texas, " and a federal court in New York applied the
two-year statute of Montana under similar circumstances.
6 5
While this may appear comparatively simple, more perplexing com-
plications lurk behind the borrowing statutes. In Seaboard Terminals
Corporation v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J.66 plaintiff sued Standard Oil,
American Oil and Socony-Vacuum in the southern district of New York.
The complaint alleged a conspiracy in restraint of trade which put plaintiff
out of business in May, 1933; the cause of action arose in Maryland,
where plaintiff's principal activities were carried on. Defendants Standard
73 F. 2d 333 (6th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 719 (1935), one-year statute
for action for conspiracy, Ky. REv. STAT. §413.140 (1) (C) (Baldwin 1943).
6149 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. §13(c) (1948).
62 Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp.
728, 738 (W.D. Ky. 1941), Ky. REV. STAT. §413.120 (Baldwin 1943). This statute
includes actions upon statutory liabilities and actions for penalties.
63 Note, Treble Damage Time Limitations: Federalism Rampant, 60 YALE
L.J. 553, 554 (1951) for a breakdown of the results in all jurisdictions, showing
that periods ranging from one to six years have been held applicable in antitrust
cases in addition to the ten-year period in the Chattanooga case.
64 Aero Sales Co. v. Columbia Steel Co., 119 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
This decision held the two year period limiting actions for debts, TEXAS CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon 1941) applicable, thus disapproving Jones & Co. v.
West Publishing Co., supra note 59.
65 Hansen Packing Co. v. Swift & Co., 27 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
Atccord, Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra note 49,
court in Missouri applied Kansas statute.
66 24 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D. N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 104 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1939)..
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and American were licensed and engaged in business in Maryland, but
defendant Socony-Vacuum was not so licensed and did no business in
Maryland. The action was commenced in June, 1936, more than three
years after the harm inflicted on plaintiff. Pursuant to the New York
borrowing statute, the court applied the three-year statute of Maryland
governing actions on the case and granted motions to dismiss as to de-
fendants Standard Oil and American Oil. However, as -to defendant
Socony-Vacuum the motion to dismiss was denied. A Maryland statute
provides that the limitation period shall not begin to run in favor of a
defendant absent from the state when the cause of action arises. Socony-
Vaccum was absent. "New York, in adopting the law of Maryland for
limitations on actions of this type, adopts not only the period of limitation
but also the provisions of Maryland that toll the running of the period ....
Action against that defendant not having been barred in Maryland, there
is nothing in Section 13 of the Civil Practice Act that bars action against
it here. The normal time fixed in the New York statutes for commence-
ment of the action, six years, had not run when the action was instituted.'6 7
A similar result was reached in a more recent New York case involving
eight corporate defendants, only four of whom were held entitled to
invoke the three-year Kansas statute.6"
Surely, these cases were correctly decided. By the same token, they
present the most bizarre consequence of the process of absorption of state
law. It may be bad enough that a cause of action exclusively cognizable by
federal courts is subject to different periods of limitations dependent on
the law of the state where the action happens to be brought. But it is
worse that different time limitations have to be applied to different de-
fendants in the same action.
At this point, the reader may wonder why nothing has been said about
private injunction suits; all the cases discussed in this article involved
treble damage actions. Surprisingly, only one case was found which held
that "the local statute of limitations applicable to actions for damages will
also be adopted and applied, in exercise of the equity jurisdiction of this
court, to the injunctive relief sought pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C.A. §26."69 Perhaps this is so since the nature of injunction suits
is such that they are brought at the earliest moment to prevent future
67 Id. at 1020.
68 Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 100 F. Supp.
15 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
69 United West Coast Theatres Corp. v. South Side Theatres, Inc., 86 F. Supp.
109, 111 (S.D. Cal. 1949). Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment as to their rights
under an agreement relating to the operation of certain motion picture theaters.
Defendants counterclaimed for treble damages and injunctive relief under the
antitrust laws. The only authority cited by the court was Russell v. Todd, 309
U.S. 280, 293 (1940), involving an equity suit for enforcement of shareholders'
liability for the debts of a joint stock land bank under the Federal Farm Loan Act.
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harm, and that, therefore, opportunities for invoking the statute of limita-
tions are less likely to arise in such cases.
II. ACCRUAL AND TOLLING OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
Finding the applicable period of limitation is, perhaps, the most
difficult, but by no means the only problem in this area. Indeed, no
limitation question can be solved without determining when the period
begins to run, whether it might have been interrupted by some event
occurring after it has begun, and, if so, how long the interruption lasted.
It is well settled that the private antitrust cause of action accrues
and the statute of limitations begins to run when the damage is inflicted
upon the plaintiff.7" However, this does not dispose of the problem.
Treble damage actions, like Government prosecutions, frequently allege
a conspiracy on the part of defendants committed by a series of overt acts
extending over a period of time. In such a case the question arises as to
whether the statute begins to run only when the purpose of the conspiracy
has been accomplished,- or the last overt act has been committed, or
whether the cause of action is to be deemed divisible for limitation pur-
poses in the sense that the statute begins to run at the time each overt act
is committed, with the result that damages for some acts may be barred
and damages for later acts may not be barred.
At this point a comparison of private litigation and criminal prosecu-
tions must be made. In criminal cases brought on an indictment or
information alleging a continuous conspiracy it has been uniformly held
that the federal statute of limitations governing such cases71 does not
begin to run until the conspiracy has been successfully completed or
abandoned.72 In Northern Kentucky Telephone Co. v. Southern Bell
70 Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F. 2d 742, 751 (9th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 613 (1937); Bluefield S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
243 Fed. 1, 20 (3rd Cir. 1917), dismissed, 248 U.S. 595 (1919) ; Levy v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Park-In Theatres, Inc. v.
Paramount-Richards Theatres, 90 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Del. 1950), aff'd, 185 F. 2d
407 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 950 (1951); Seaboard Terminals Corp.
v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., supra note 66; Pastor v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 76 F. Supp.
781 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 204 F. 2d 166
(8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825 (1953).
71 See note 5 supra.
72 U.S. v. Kissel and Harned, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910), "... when the plot
contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without
the continuous cooperation of the conspirators to keep it up, and there is such
continuous cooperation, it is a perversion of natural thought and of natural
language to call such continuous cooperation a cinematographic series of distinct
conspiracies, rather than to call it a single one." At p. 608 Mr. Justice Holmes
added: "A conspiracy in restraint of trade is different from and more than a
contract in restraint of trade. . . . The contract is instantaneous, the partnership
may endure as one and the same partnership for years. A conspiracy is a partner-
ship in criminal purposes." Accord, Boyle v. U.S., 259 Fed. 803 (7th Cir. 1919);
U.S. v. Johnson, 165 F. 2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 852 (1948) ;
U.S. v. Detroit Sheet Metal & Roofing Contractors Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.
Mich. 1953).
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Telephone and Telegraph Co.,7 3 the question arose for the first time as
to whether this doctrine should be followed in a civil action for treble
damages. The applicable state statute prescribed a limitation period of
one year. The action was commenced on May 2, 1931, alleging that
defendants entered into a conspiracy in 1926 which continued since then.
But all overt acts alleged by plaintiff occurred more than one year prior
to May 2, 1931. Plaintiff, relying on the decisions involving criminal
prosecutions, contended "that a conspiracy, until successful or terminated,
is a continuing wrong, and that, so long as damages flow, and this with-
out regard to the time of formation or the commission of overt acts, the
statute does not begin to run." The Sixth Circuit held that the criminal
cases do not justify such broad interpretation for civil cases, since "no civil
action will lie for a conspiracy unless there be an overt act that results
in damage to the plaintiff." Thus, "when there is an overt act, or the
last of a contemplated series of overt acts, the cause of action accrues
and the statute begins to run."7 4 Hence, the action was held barred.7
Similarly, in Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 76 the
First Circuit suggested that the criminal rule could not simply be trans-
planted into treble damage actions; otherwise "a single act of damage
in an antitrust case would be subject to no period of limitation so long
as'the conspiracy continued, although no further injury was done to the
plaintiff." Based on this reasoning, the First Circuit affirmed a ruling
"that a cause of action for each invasion of the plaintiff's interest arose
at the time of that invasion and that the applicable statute of limitations
ran from that time."
It is true that plaintiff in the Momand case sued as assignee of claims
assigned to him by several corporations in April, 1931 and December,
1933, which plaintiff characterized as asserting separate causes of action
for injuries said to have been inflicted by defendants on each one of
plaintiff's assignors. Nevertheless, plaintiff contended that he was suing
as assignee of the victims of a continuing conspiracy, and it was, precisely,
this contention which the court rejected. Park-In Theatres, Inc. v.
Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. 77 took the same approach: The
action in that case indicated two overt acts, and both had been committed
more than three years before the suit was filed. Citing Momand, and
holding the action was barred, the Court said that:
73 See note 60 supra.
7 The court added: "If this were not true, then it would result that, in
every case where damages resulting from a wrongful act are in their nature
continuing, there would be no limitation upon the right of action, and the beneficent
purpose of the statute to put a period to the right to sue would be defeated." 73 F.
2d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 1934).
75 See also Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.,
supra note 68, for recognition of "the single nature of plaintiff's cause of action."
100 F. Supp., at 30.
76 172 F. 2d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
77 90 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Del. 1950).
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A civil case ... is based upon the damage caused by the com-
mission of the overt act and the applicable statute must run
from the time of the commission of that act which is alleged
to have caused the damage....
In the present complaint two, and two only, overt acts
are expressly alleged and these are of date beyond the Statute
of Limitations, although damages resulting therefrom may have
continued.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
We may, then, conclude that accrual of the cause of action for
treble damages based on a conspiracy occurs when damages are inflicted
by overt acts. In criminal cases, where the emphasis is not the individual
harm, but the public interest, the last overt act is not decisive, and the
statute may begin to run at a subsequent date, if the conspiracy continues.
Moreover, since the purpose of the private action is the redress of individual
damage, the statute begins to run from each overt act inflicting such
damage, with the result that, usually, the plaintiff may recover only if
at least one overt act was committed within the limitation period. Hence,
as shown in Momand, and many other cases, 79 the claim for damages as-
serted in one action may be barred with respect to some but not all overt
acts alleged in the complaint. In other words, for limitation purposes
"each overt act creates a new cause of action." s°
But suppose the complaint is not based on the theory of a conspiracy
constituting a series of separate and divisible acts; instead, plaintiff as-
serts that defendants acted pursuant to a continuous plan to drive him out
of business by threatening his customers with patent infringement suits,
harassing plaintiff and his licensees with spurious lawsuits and defaming
his products. In such a situation, at least one court found a single, in-
divisible cause of action which was not barred with respect to any part of
the damages inflicted."' In another case the court indicated that the cause
of action accrued when plaintiff was forced to sell his theatre as a result
of a series of prior unlawful acts by defendant. 2 This suggests that the
time of accrual of the cause of action for damages from a conspiracy may
depend on the facts, of each conspiracy case, the way these facts are
described in the pleadings and the court's willingness to accept that de-
scription as relevant to and determinative of the accrual problem.8 3 Ob-
78 Id. at 729.
79 Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, supra note 59; Bluefield S.S. Co. v.
United Fruit Co., supra note 70; Aero Sales Co. v. Columbia Steel Co., supra note
64; Fulton v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 44; Bascom Launder Corp. v. Farny, 10
F.R.D. 421 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) ; Levy v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 787
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
80 Wilson, The Origin and Limited Life of the Anti-Trust Cause of Action,
21 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 127, 128-131 (1953).
81 Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., supra
note 68.
82 Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 51.
83 Wilson, op. cit. supra note 80, at 138, 139.
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viously, a finding that the cause of action for the redress of aml damages
resulting from the conspiracy accrued at the time of the last overt act
would, in effect, prolong the limitation period, while the theory of divisible
causes of action might provide an incentive for commencing the action soon
after plaintiff had suffered at least some damage. On the other hand,
it may be difficult to prove damages before the conspiracy has reached its
goal. In any event, the theory of divisible causes of actions reflects the
policy of imposing on antitrust plaintiffs the duty of diligence in filing
suits, and this may he more in keeping with the general philosophy of
limitations than the opposite approach, at least in those situations where
damage claims can be substantiated even though the conspiracy continues.
Plaintiff's duty of diligence is also an issue in another and, perhaps,
even more important aspect of the accrual problem. Plaintiffs in treble
damage actions charging continuous conspiracies not infrequently allege
that the conspiracy was fraudulently concealed and that the statute should
not begin to run against them until they discovered the conspiracy. In such
a case the question arises as to whether plaintiffs were actually ignorant
of the conspiracy, and whether they could have learned about it by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. If so, the plea of ignorance may have
to be disregarded.
This question was squarely presented in Burnham Chemical Co. v.
Borax Consolidated, Ltd."4 The action was instituted in July 1945 in the
northern district of California, complaining of certain overt acts com-
mitted by defendants in 1925 and 1928 in pursuance of a conspiracy
instigated by British and German interests to monopolize world trade in
borax. The complaint alleged that, as a result of these acts, plaintiff's
plant was closed in January 1929, that since that time plaintiffs attempted
to secure from the United States Government a mineral lease, and that
defendants, from 1929 to the time of suit, made persistent efforts to
thwart such plans. Plaintiff admitted that it could not prove damages
from this, but that, without want of diligence on its part, it was ignorant
of defendants' earlier fraudulent activities, the true nature of which it
discovered only in 1944, when the Government filed an antitrust suit
against defendants. Only then did plaintiff learn about the conspiracy,
and its complaint was based on the same allegations as those contained in
the Government's complaint. Plaintiff thus contended that its cause of
action accrued only in 1944, the year of discovery, and, therefore, the
California three-year statute was no bar to its action. The Ninth Circuit,
affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint, said:
We agree with the conclusions.... that the record firmly
establishes as a fact that during the. time from May 17, 1929
to October 10, 1939 appellant knew, or had good cause and
reason to believe, that its business had been theretofore damaged
and that it had been driven out of business by acts of appellees
84 170 F. 2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949).
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which violated the antitrust laws of the United States; that
appellant was, during this period, convinced that it had a good
case against appellees for the damage it had then suffered....
We hold that... the only damages for which a recovery might
be had are those which accrued and were suffered within three
years prior to the filing of the complaint and the record reveals
that none were shown during this period. .... "
The same court reached the same result in a subsequent suit brought
by other domestic manufacturers of borax against the same defendants."6
Here, again, the court emphasized that "the ultimate and determinative
facts constituting the legal basis of this action" were known to plaintiffs
many years before they filed suit and that, consequently:
The claimed ignorance of the existence of a formal conspiracy
along with its exact date, precise terms, specific objectives and
other evidentiary matter would be immaterial so far as regards
the question of the California statute of limitations, as would
any alleged concealment thereof. Furthermore, appellants bare
allegation of fraudulent concealment is but a conclusion of law
which falls far short of the particularity of statement required
by Rule 9(b). s7
This would seem to imply, as indeed, it has been repeatedly stated
by other courts, 8 that specific pleadings of fraudulent concealment and
of plaintiff's inability to discover the facts with due diligence, if sustained
by the evidence, would prevent accrual of the cause of action. It would,
of course, be very difficult to sustain the burden of proving ignorance not
due to negligence; yet, antitrust claimants have occasionally succeeded in
persuading juries and courts so to hold."
85 Id. at 578.
86 Suckow-Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 185
F. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
87 Id. at 209. For another example of judicial insistence on plaintiff's diligence
see Ben C. Jones & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 270 Fed. 563 (5th Cir. 1921),
writ of error dismissed, 270 U.S. 665 (1926): Filing of action will not toll statute
unless service of summons be made within reasonable time thereafter.
88 Crummer Co. v. DuPont, 117 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Fla. 1954): "A
party seeking to avoid the bar of the statute on account of fraud must aver and
show lack of knowledge and that he used diligence to discover it." Strout v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., 208 Fed. 646, 651, 652 (D.C. Mass. 1913). Plaintiff
required "to specify the date and circumstances of his discovery of the cause of
action, and his allegations must show that he exercised reasonable diligence, yet
was unable to discover it earlier." Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co.,
85 F. 2d 742, 752 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 613 (1937).
89 American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 Fed. 58 (5th Cir.
1913): question whether plaintiff knew, or ought to have known, that decline of its
profits was due to defendant's conspiracy, was submitted to the jury; see also
Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 29
(S.D. N.Y. 1951). For an example of the same problem outside the antitrust field,
see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 Fed. 2d 185, 191 (Sth Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 730 (1946). See, generally, as to accrual of the statute of
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Apart from the accrual problem, which determines the time the
statute begins to run, other grounds for tolling the statute require brief
reference. As noted above, adoption of the state statutes implies adoption
of their tolling provisions. In addition, there are federal grounds for
tolling. One of these is probably no longer of current interest: The
so-called Federal "Moratorium" or "War Time Tolling Act" provided
"that the running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to viola-
tions of the antitrust laws of the United States . . . shall be suspended
until June 30, 1946" in all cases where the existing statute had not yet
fully run on October 10, 1942, when this act became effective." The
other is the vitally important second paragraph of Section 5 of the Clayton
Act91 which tolls the statute in private actions during the pendency "of a
Government suit involving the same facts."
It seems to be settled that this tolling provision is available only
against defendants who were also defendants in the Government suit, and
that it ceases to be effective against any defendant as soon as a final judg-
ment in the Government suit has been rendered against such defeandant.92
The only real difficulty arises with respect to the question as to whether
consent decrees do or do not terminate the "pendency" of a Government
suit. This question was presented in several cases involving treble damage
actions against the major motion picture producers and distributors who
were defendants in the Government's suit in U.S. v. Paramount, which
was instituted in 1938. In November 1940 a consent decree was entered
against four of the defendants without benefit of trial; this decree recited
that it should not be construed as an admission or adjudication of the
truth of the charges, and provided for continuation of the proceedings
limitations in cases of fraudulent concealment and plaintiff's duty of diligence in
discovery, 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Action §§183-196 (1948).
90 56 STAT. 781 (1942), c. 589, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Oct. 10, 1942, as amended
by 59 STAT. 306 (1945), 79th Cong. 1st Sess., c. 213, June 30, 1945. This act has
been frequently applied to private antitrust litigation. Tiffin Building Corp. v.
Balaban & Katz Corp., 87 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Il. 1949); United West Coast
Theatres Corp. v. South Side Theatres, Inc., supra note 69; Russellville Canning
Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), reversed on other
grounds, 191 F. 2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951); Reid v. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
supra note 56; Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note 59.
91 See note 9 supra.
92 Levy v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 104 F, Supp. 787, 789 {_N.D. Cal. 1952);
Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, 172 F. 2d 37, 48 (1st Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U. S. 967 (1949); Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 944 (W.D. Mo. 1953). A Government action ceases to be
"pending" when "a final decree is either disposed of on appeal, or, if no appeal is
taken, when the time for appeal has expired." In Christensen v. Paramount Pic-
tures, supra note 59, the tolling provision was held not applicable against the
wholly owned subsidiary of a parent corporation when only the parent was a party
to the Government suit. The tolling was also not available against a defendant
who was a party in a government action for the purpose of rescinding a release
of treble damage claims: Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consolidated Theatres,
Inc., 208 F. 2d 316 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
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after a specified period of time.93 Four years later, the Government
moved for trial, and the case reached the Supreme Court, which in 1948
affirmed in part a decree enjoining certain practices; the case was, how-
ever, remanded to the district court for the purpose of reconsidering the
adequacy of the remedies originally prescribed by that court. 4  Subse-
quently, new consent decrees were entered into on November 8, 1948
and March 3, 1949 against defendants RKO and Paramount who pre-
ferred not to wait for the district court's decision on remand. 5 These
consent decrees stated that jurisdiction was retained "for the purpose of
enabling any of the parties to this consent decree to apply to the court at
any time for such orders or direction as may be necessary or appropriate
for the construction, modification or carrying out of the same, for the
enforcement of compliance therewith, and for the punishment of violations
thereof. . . ., Orders were entered pursuant to this clause of these
decrees from time to time as late as January 2, 195 l." A decree against
the other non-consenting defendants was entered and affirmed in 1950.8
The courts have been unanimous in holding that the first consent
decree of November 20, 1940 was interlocutory in nature and, therefore,
did not terminate the pendency of the Government suit with the result
that the statute of limitations remained tolled." With respect to the 1948
and 1949 consent decrees the problem was more difficult, since these de-
crees purported to decide the controversy on the merits after remand from
the Supreme Court to the district court, even though they left the door
open for future adjustments to changing conditions; however, this is not
an uncommon practice in equity. Hence, with one exception, all courts
have considered these decrees as final for the purpose of terminating the
tolling effect of the Government suit against the consenting defendants,
as provided in Section 5 of the Clayton Act.' In the majority view, it
was deemed irrelevant that the 1948 and 1949 consent decrees were sub-
sequently modified. On the other hand, the minority view would prolong
93 U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323, 331-33 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
94334 U.S. 131 (1948). Decision on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. N.Y.
1949).
95 Sun Theater Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 213 F. 2d 284, 293, 294 (7th
Cir. 1954). The consent decrees mentioned in the text were entered before the
district court's decision on remand from the Supreme Court.
96Don George, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 458, 466
(W.D. La. 1951).
97 Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO, supra note 95.
9 8 Loew's, Inc. v. U.S., 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
99 Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO, supra note 95; Leonia Amusement Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., supra note 51; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside
Theatre Corp., 194 F. 2d 846 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952) ;
Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, supra note 59.
100 Manny v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ;
Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO, supra note 95; Barnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dis-
tributing Corp., 112 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. 11. 1953). Contra, Don George, Inc., v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note 96. Comment, 22 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 514 (1955).
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the tolling period as long as jurisdiction is retained in a consent decree.
This might conceivably wipe out any effective limitation, or discourage
the use of consent decrees with retention of jurisdiction. In fact, it might
even be argued under this theory that final, non-appealable decrees issued
against non-consenting defendants should not be considered as ending the
Government action if retention of jurisdiction has been provided. We
agree with the recent suggestion of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws that this would be undesirable.
101
The Committee also recommended to amend Section 5 of the Clay-
ton Act by a specific proviso that suspension "should be limited to the period
of time during which the Government action is actively pending and
contested."'0 2 It could be argued that there was no active contest for
several years after the Paramount decree of November 1940; therefore,
the amendment proposed by the Committee, taken alone, would have
suspended the tolling period at that time. Yet, this would have been
inequitable because the 1940 consent decree was not a "final" decree
within the meaning of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Clayton Act
and, consequently, could not have been admitted in evidence in any private
suit against the same defendants,10 3 although the statute of limitations
would have begun to run pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 5
for the benefit of the same defendants. Perhaps it was in recognition of
this difficulty that the committee added this additional recommendation:
The suspension [of the statute of limitations] should be
effective only for cases where the person relying on the sus-
pension is permitted to introduce the judgment or decree in the
Government suit as prima facie evidence under the other pro-
visions of Section 5, or where he would have been permitted to
introduce such judgment or decree but for the fact that the
Government lost its case or the judgment or decree was entered
on consent .... 104 (Emphasis supplied.)
10 1AATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-TRUST
LAWS, REPORT at p. 384 (March 31, 1955). The committee's discussion of this
point (pp. 382-84) does not clearly explain the basic difference between the differ-
ent types of consent decrees used in the Paramount litigation.
102 Ibid.
103 The first paragraph of that section provides "That a final judgment or
decree hereafter rendered in any criminal prosecution or in any suit or proceeding
in equity brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws
... shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding
brought by any other party against such defendant. This section shall not apply
to consent judgments . .. entered before any testimony has been taken." This
last sentence automatically made the 1940 consent decree in the Paramount case
inadmissible as evidence. The suggestion that, by the same token, it should not be
considered as suspending the tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 5 appears convincing. Comment, Section 5 of the
Clayton Act-Consent Decrees and the Statute of Limitations, 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV.
514 (1955).
1 0 4
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, p. 385.
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In other words, this somewhat cryptically worded sentence may mean
that the tolling period should not be cut off by a non-final consent decree
which was entered before any testimony was taken, since such a decree
would not be admissible in any private suit. If so, it would satisfactorily
qualify the Committee's previously discussed recommendation with respect
to the duration of the tolling period. Otherwise, this would unduly limit
the present tolling provision without any showing of need for such a
change.
III. TOWARD A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION.
A situation similar to the one we have described in this article existed
in the field of minimum wages and maximum hours: The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 19381'5 was enacted without a statute of limitations.
In 1947 Congress corrected this omission by adding such a statute.1"6
However, no similar correction has yet been made with respect to the
antitrust laws, although bills proposing a uniform statute of limitations
are being or have been considered by every Congress since 1949.07 In
view of the seemingly obvious desirability of ending the chaos now pre-
vailing in this area it would appear to be astonishing, or even incredible,
that these repeated efforts have not, as yet, been successful.
The first of these bills was introduced in the 81st Congress at the
request of Mr. George B. Burnham, president of the Burnham Chemical
Company. That Company, as noted above, had lost its suit in the Ninth
Circuit against Borax Consolidated, Ltd., and other participants in an
alleged Borax cartel on the ground that the statute of limitations barred
the action and that there was no showing that the cause of action had not
or could not have been discovered before 1944."' s As soon as the decision
adverse to the Burnham Company became final by the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari, Mr. Burnham appealed to Congress and two practi-
cally identical bills were introduced in each house. Mr. Burnham also
submitted extensive memoranda setting forth the history of his fight against
the big producers of borax and explaining his purposes as designed to "give
small business a better chance to curb monopoly."' 0 9 These bills provided
for a six-year statute of limitations; if the action was based upon an
alleged conspiracy, the action would be barred "within six years after the
105 52 STAT. 1060-69 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§201-219 (1947).
106 61 STAT. 87 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §255 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
107 S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings, supra note 15. See also Part 2
of the same hearings (August 4, 1949), hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings
No. 2. H.R. 7905 and H.R. 8763, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings, supra note 8.
H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings, supra note 4. H.R. 467, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess. H.R. 794, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. Introduced by Mr. Keating on January
5, 1955). REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMriTEE, supra note 101 at 383, has
also recommended amendment of Section 4 of the Clayton Act by adding a four
year statute of limitations.
108 See text to notes 84 and 85 supra.
109Hearings, supra note 15, at 16-30; Senate Hearings No. 2 pp. 63-78;
Hearings, supra note 8, at 24-40, 74-75, 78-85.
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discovery by the plaintiff of the facts upon which he relies for proof of
the existence of such conspiracy, if the plaintiff has exercised due diligence
in seeking to discover such facts." ' °
It will be remembered that the Ninth Circuit, in the Burnham
Chemical Co. case, held that many years before commencement of the
suit plaintiff knew or ought to have known that its business had been
damaged by defendants' antitrust violations. However, the language of
these bills, by focusing attention on knowledge of the facts on which
plaintiff relied for proof, might, conceivably, have been interpreted more
favorably to Mr. Burnham. Indeed, Mr. Burnham had contended in the
litigation that he relied on the facts alleged in the Government's complaint
which was filed in 1944. Moreover, these bills contained no provisions
preventing retroactive applicablity. Could this mean a possible retrial of a
lost case?
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that vigorous opposition
developed at the hearings.11 ' Professor Handler told the House committee
that the discovery provisions of these bills "introduce an uncertainty which
is repugnant to the very idea of a statute of repose.""' 2 He pointed out
that it was not clear whether "the facts" would mean all the facts, and
whether "relied upon" referred to "the facts necessary to establish the
existence of the conspiracy or merely such evidence as may be relied upon
by the plaintiff in his good judgment as relevant and material?" The
latter would be unfair to defendants and "will clutter the courts with
protracted litigation over stale events of ancient vintage.""'  It should
be added that these provisions were unnecessary, since, as we have demon-
strated above, the courts are always willing to consider an allegation that
plaintiff, even with utmost diligence, could not have discovered the facts
of a conspiracy which defendants tried to conceal. Of course, plaintiff
would have the burden of proof, and in the Burnham Chemical case the
court merely found that such an allegation had not been substantiated.
All subsequent bills, therefore, wisely dropped these discovery provisions.
The bill now pending in the 84th Congress simply states that the cause of
action shall be barred unless commenced within the time specified "after
the cause of action accrued." It also meets objections against revival of
causes of action which would be barred under existing law by expressly
forbidding such revival." 4
110 S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings, supra note 15, at 1; H.RL 7905,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings, supra note 8, at 1.
111 To make matters worse, the House bill proposed to change the provision
in Section 5 of the Clayton Act, that a judgment obtained by the Government
against an antitrust defendant shall be prima. facie evidence against such defendant
in private litigation, to mike such evidence conclusive. Hearings, supra note 8,
at 2. Subsequent bills omitted this proposal.
112 Id. at 20.
113 Id. at 21, 22.
114 H.R. 794, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. Hearings, supra note 8 at 77 and Hearings,
snpra note 4 at 39: objections against retroactive application.
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The bill before the 82nd Congress was vigorously opposed by counsel
for the Motion Picture Association, consisting of the producers and dis-
tributors of motion pictures.11 5 He described the alleged danger to his
industry resulting from excessive treble damage suits, but the statistics sub-
mitted by him tabulated only claims without showing the amounts actually
recovered.11 6 He heavily emphasized that there were "changing concepts
in the courts, making things illegal which were formerly legal,""' such
as block booking,"' but he admitted that the Department of Justice had
never approved that practice." 9 Moreover, a witness for independent
theater owners demonstrated that block booking, which denied to in-
dependent exhibitors freedom of choice of films, had been under fire for
many years, and was held illegal by the district court in the first
Paramount decision in June 1946.120 In this connection it is essential to
observe that the majority of antitrust damage actions brought by exhibitors
are based on the Government's successful suit against Paramount; hence,
the argument that defendants in that suit could not have foreseen its ad-
verse result is, in substance, an argument against any private liability rather
than against a uniform federal statute of limitations. Yet, no one has
seriously proposed the abolition of private liability.
121
In summary, the motion picture industry centered its attack on the
proposed limitation period of six years; it recommended a three-year
period 22 as representing an average between the various state periods and
as being entirely adequate, particularly in view of the tolling provisions
of the Clayton Act.1 23 Counsel for the industry also suggested that the
period of limitation for private actions and Government prosecutions should
be the same. 124 The latter was recently increased to five years, 125 and,
perhaps for that reason, the bill now pending provides for that period.
The same period should also be made applicable to injunction suits under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act.
In addition the pending bill would modify the suspension provisions
of Section 5 of the Clayton Act: Under this proposed amendment, a
1IG Hearings, supra note 4, at 37-49, 57-72.
116 Id. at 109-Ill. Cf. id. at 92.
117 Hearings, supra note 4, at 64.
118 "The practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature or group
of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group
of features released by the distributors during a given period ... " U.S. v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S., at 156.
119 Hearings, supra note 4, at 70.
120 Id. at 86-89.
121 REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra note 101, at 379, favors
"vesting in the trial judge discretion to impose double or treble damages."
122 Hearings, supra note 4, at 71.
12 3 1d. at 59, 60, 62. For a compilation of the different periods, see id. at
109-111.
12+Id. at 38.
125 See note 5 supra.
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private action would have to be brought either within one year after
termination of the Government suit or within five years after the cause
of action accrued .1 6 Thus, if the cause of action accrued in 1955 and
the Government's suit involving the same defendant were filed in 1957
and terminated in 1963, the private action would have to be filed not
later than 1964; without this amendment, plaintiff could wait until 1966,
since only two of the five years had elapsed when the suspension began.
Implicit in this proposal is the idea that private antitrust claimants should
closely watch Government suits affecting their interests and move fast as
soon as the Government suit has ended. Although there may be legitimate
differences of opinion as to this proposal, which is hostile to plaintiffs in
some circumstances, it would appear to be defensible on the ground that
private litigants usually experience no difficulty in keeping informed
through their trade associations about Government antitrust suits in-
volving their industries.
We hope to have demonstrated in the preceding pages that the
confusion of the present law can be eliminated only by Congress, and that
six years would seem to be more than ample for legislative consideration
of this problem. Legislative action should be delayed no longer.
126 H.R. 794, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., would amend §5 as follows: "... the
running of the statute of limitations ... shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, that 'whenever the run-
ning of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under
Section 4 . . . is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action
shall be fore'ver barred unless commenced either 'within the period of suspension
or within five years after the cause of action accrued." (Matter in italics is new.)
A similar recommendation was made in the REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COM-
MriTEE, supra note 101, at 384.
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